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The practical operationalisation of resilience within cities is strongly linked to technology, 
such as better construction materials or redesigning urban form. Institutional and private 
sector actors often focus on issues relating to the technological innovation journey, such 
as ‘pathways’ to implementation or ‘barriers’ to market uptake, rather than whether 
adaptive technologies are the most appropriate resilience solution. These discourses 
frame urban resilience from the perspective of an innovation journey where technologies 
are perceived to succeed if there is high uptake. However, given the multi-perspective 
and multi-scale nature of urban resilience, the idea of ‘success’ inevitably has complex 
spatial, temporal and scalar dimensions. The paper uses the case of property level flood 
resilience (PFR) technologies in the United Kingdom to introduce the notion of 
‘contingent resilience’ as a means to understand the trade-offs that are part of assessing 
and evaluating climate resilient technologies. We reveal that there are fundamental 
contradictions in what is deemed as a ‘success’ depending on who is framing the 
problem, when the judgement is made, or where the scale of analysis lies. Above all, the 
paper highlights the importance of illuminating the struggles that do not just define 








• Climate resilience in urban areas is increasingly turning to adaptive technologies 
in practice. 
• Governments define success via innovation journeys and market uptake. 
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• Success in adaptive technologies varies between actors, across scales, and over 
time. 
• We should recognise the continency of resilience when appraising the success 




‘The elimination of the word “success” is important’ 
Cedric Price (quoted in Mathews, 2005: 78 – 9) 
 
The current zeitgeist around smart, sustainable and resilient cities emphasises 
innovation and creativity as a means to address the challenges of environmental change 
(Viitanen and Kingston 2014; Hodson and Marvin 2014; Hodson et al. 2017). For many, 
the challenge is to understand how technologies are adopted within societies; that is, 
how technologies achieve successful market uptake and salience (e.g. Jaffe et al., 2005; 
Geels and Smit, 2000; Geels 2004). While innovative technologies and the sharing of 
learning between cities around resilience issues can be a positive experience, 
technological implementation can lead to a ‘moral hazard’, directing attention away from 
the need to change risky behaviours (Corner and Pidgeon 2014). Many also fail to 
question the extent to which technological innovation is preferred due to its synergies 
with economic growth, or notions of ‘progress’ (Gray, 2004). Such approaches may 
privilege ‘human exceptionalism’ (Catton and Dunlap, 1978), with ‘nature’ cast as 
something to be mastered through human ingenuity (White, 2015; Swyngedouw, 2015). 
 
Similar critical observations have permeated resilience theory and practice, particularly 
with regard to analysing the power and politics around who shapes agendas and 
outcomes, noting that the resilience rhetoric ‘[imposes] a rationality that is incongruent 
with the complex reality of how socio-economic issues combine with ecological systems’ 
(Bahadur and Tanner, 2014: 203). For example, scholars acknowledge how resilience is 
complex, contingent and contested amongst different actors, which emphasises the 
importance of developing governance perspectives that are able to bring these political 
issues to light (e.g. Bahadur and Tanner, 2014, O’Hare and White, 2013; Vale, 2014; 
Chelleri et al., 2015; Meerow and Newell, 2016, Davoudi et al., 2018). Although 
technology will undoubtedly be part of the mix of urban resilience strategies, there is a 
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need to recognise the extent to which its implementation may also bring hidden 
redistributive risk effects. Yes, the application of technology within cities may be deemed 
a ‘success’, but critical questions remain with regard to for whom, when, and where 
(Meerow and Newell, 2016).  
 
With the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change proclaiming that we have very little 
time in order to keep global warming to below 1.5°C (IPCC, 2018), climate resilience has 
taken a distinctively adaptive turn. Despite the risk that climate change presents, there 
is a realpolitik at play where many organisations and policy-makers try to emphasise the 
economic positives that can be gained through enabling resilience, particularly where it 
relates to innovation and investment in new technology. For instance, the European 
Commission (2013: 5) promotes the realisation of ‘climate-proof cities’ where ‘adaptation 
action will bring new market opportunities and jobs’. The UK Government (2011: 2) has 
similarly merged risk and opportunity, identifying resilience as a key feature of a ‘green 
economy’ which ‘can help UK businesses to manage risks…increase resilience…and 
seize the opportunities from new and emerging markets, both nationally and 
internationally’. Likewise, the 100 Resilient Cities initiative drew from the language of 
investment, frequently discussing the value of a ‘resilience dividend’ or emphasising that 
cities struggle to undertake projects often due to the difficulty in proving the ‘bankability’ 
of potential solutions (Rowling, 2018). In urban areas, resilience has thus been 
increasingly re-framed as a technological, political and administrative strategy that 
provides economic benefits for those who either design responses or reap the benefits 
of their implementation.  
 
To develop the analysis, we examine a particular kind of adaptive technology—Property-
level Flood Resilience (PFR)—to open up a conceptual discussion around the divergent 
success claims inherent within adaptive technologies. PFR technologies are applied at 
building scale in order to reduce the direct risk of flooding to a property. The importance 
of PFR has steadily grown since 2007 as part of flood risk management strategy in the 
UK and elsewhere to provide resilience at local scales. Such measures may be 
temporary or permanent and include door guards, window guards, air brick covers, and 
flood doors (Fig 1). PFR technologies can be broadly divided into two types: resistance 
measures that aim to keep flood waters out of a property (or to slow the rate of entry) 
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and resilience measures that assume that property will enter a property and seek to 
minimise damage (e.g. easy-to-replace internal materials).  
 
 
Fig. 1: Example of a PFR resistance measure: a temporary guard in operation with 
air brick cover. Source: Authors, January 2018. [In colour] 
 
By interrogating the complex and interconnected nature of the system within which these 
technologies are designed and integrated, we reveal and question the processes of 
interpretation and negotiation that are core to urban resilience and identify current gaps 
between theory and practice. There are two main parts to the argument. First, that 
although ‘success’ is predominately framed by institutional and private sector actors and 
agencies in line with long-held norms of technological innovation journeys and market 
uptake, the broader success of resilience is inherently dependent: it is contextual, 
relative, and contingent across space, time and scale. In particular, property owners 
viewed success as more about absolute performance than implementation or relative 
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improvement. The ‘best flood ever’ referred to in the title was still a disruptive flood even 
though it was less destructive because of the implementation of mitigating measures. . 
Second, by drawing on the intellectual resources of Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) this research contributes to ongoing critiques relating the translation of resilience 
theory to practice by highlighting how the growing trend for adopting technical, designed 
urban ‘solutions’ should be subject to parallel critical attention concerning claims of 
resilience ‘success’. To merge these two themes, we introduce the term ‘contingent 
resilience’ as a means to better communicate that ideas of success will only hold for 
certain people, at certain times and in certain places. By highlighting how adaptive 
technologies can only ever bring ‘contingent resilience’ we help bring to light and deepen 
the multi-perspective and multi-scale dimensions of urban resilience and contribute to 
discourses relating to translating resilience theory into practice in cities. 
 
Unsettling the success-failure binary in complex systems 
Given how the practical implementation of resilience has gained momentum, particularly 
through the introduction of new technologies, we commence by examining 
conceptualisations of technology and its relationship to society. There is also a need to 
understand the complexity of risk and resilience, how this is governed, and perceptions 
of these concepts. Doing so reveals the importance of asking questions concerning the 
actors involved in a technology’s becoming (who?), the scale at which it is applied 
(where?), and the timescale that technology operates in (when?). To underpin the 
conceptual framing this section links two main strands of literature: STS and critiques of 
resilience regarding its contingent nature.   
 
STS examines the way in which technology and society co-evolve through the mutual 
shaping of technology and practice (e.g. Jasanoff 2004; 2012). In the context of urban 
development, technologies are refracted through policies, institutions, intermediaries, 
and social practices—all of which can be understood as a set of relations that help govern 
and mediate (Jasanoff, 2005). From this perspective, technologies are socially contested 
and negotiated, a view that seeks to unsettle the uncritical linearity that is so closely 
associated with the ‘becoming’ of technology (Hughes, 1987; Bijker et al., 1987). The 
existence of a ‘black box’ effect common to technical objects (e.g. Jacobs et al., 2007) 
does, however, mean that those with technical competencies, such as elite actors or 
agencies, hold significant power during these processes to frame desirable outcomes 
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(e.g. White, 2019). Therefore, when promoting technologies within complex and dynamic 
social-ecological systems, claims of success are hidden displays of power. For instance, 
literature on urban risks recognises how the introduction of technologies may create 
cascading or new risks to complex systems, or even serve to normalise or redistribute 
threats and responsibilities rather than ‘solve’ risks (Beck, 1992, 1999; Giddens, 1991). 
Research also argues that technology is fetishised and privileged in notions of progress 
and emancipation (Kaika, 2005) with threats and crises paradoxically recast as 
opportunities for (neo-liberal) economic growth (Klein, 2007).  
 
In acknowledging the uncertainty of urban resilience, the technical professions have 
responded with a shift away from precise ‘fail-safe’ approaches to develop technologies 
that are ‘safe-to-fail’: where ‘failures and design systems [are anticipated] strategically 
so that failure is contained and minimized’ (Ahern, 2011: 342). This shift towards 
contingency highlights the importance of interrogating success claims, particularly those 
that maintain the central position of technological innovation, despite acknowledging 
failure at different scales within highly networked urban systems. It also links to the 
governance of urban resilience: who or what, for example, holds liability should there be 
a failure? Claims of success, therefore, also make claims of liability and responsibility. 
Allied to this, the presence of ‘residual risks’ - those which remain even where adaptive 
technologies have been put in place - raise further questions over the temporality of 
‘success’.   
 
To add further nuance to the governance of urban resilience, individuals perceive safety, 
risk, and danger differently which is partly institutionalised through organisational 
structures (Pidgeon, 2010). However, the acknowledgement of varying conceptions of 
risk lie outside of many academic and policy discourses on technical innovations (see 
Hodson et al., 2007). While there is a preferred truth in policy narratives concerning the 
promotion of technology and the provision of information to overcome barriers, more 
theoretical research questions this simplistic stance. For instance, Pidgeon (2010: 213) 
argues that: ‘(…) the problem may become so complex, vague or dynamic…that different 
individuals and organisations can only ever hold partial, and often very different and 
changing, interpretations of the situation’. Such a changeable view can be seen in 
relation to the variable individual perception over time dependent upon where ‘people’s 
relationships to particular risky technologies are more open and transitory than 
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references to “fear”, “dread”, “anxiety” or “concern” would imply’ and where everyday 
attitudes towards a potentially risky technology can ‘move in/out of proximity’ to the 
individual (Bickerstaff and Simmons, 2009: 867). Moreover, while risk information is 
provided by various agencies, data can be inconsistent and there is ambiguity over how 
citizens understand this (Wachinger et al., 2013). Essentially this literature emphasises 
the tension between theoretical work that positions risk as mutable, multi-dimensional, 
and multi-scalar, and more simplistic claims of urban resilience success relating to, say, 
barriers, technological uptake or adoption, or market penetration. Furthermore, it 
highlights how a focus on implementation may mask ‘the extent to which there are often 
bitter disputes over the technology itself’ (Latour, 2003: 37).  
 
Scalar tensions are also evident when considering urban resilience (Davoudi et al., 
2018). Flood defences in high value neighbourhoods may increase exposure to others 
less able to benefit from such measures (Bahadur and Tanner, 2014). Further, local 
innovation activities may conflict with national level priorities (Taylor Buck and While, 
2015) or flood defences may legitimise building on flood plains even though approaches 
at catchment scales caution against this; a phenomenon known as the ‘safe development 
paradox’ (Burby, 2006). Given this, clear-cut understandings of what constitutes as 
‘success’ in terms of resilience building will vary at different spatial scales. Successful 
implementation can lead to contradictory outcomes and potential ‘failure’ at other spatial 
scales. 
 
Research also highlights that claims of temporal success should not be uncritically 
accepted. Technologies may appear to be fixed and stable entities, but they have fluid 
dimensions where ‘there are many grades and shades of ‘working’, or adaptations and 
variants’ (de Laet and Mol, 2000: 225). Technological fixes also deteriorate over time, 
with an associated decline in their efficacy. The temporal question can be seen in more 
mundane discussions around repair and maintenance which are often overlooked in 
favour of the innovative and creative moments of production (Graham and Thrift, 2007). 
This focus reveals further tensions within designations of success; the need to repair and 
maintain may be regarded as a ‘failure’ of some component. Moreover, ‘successful’ 
material artefacts such as buildings, may in fact have ‘failed’ in the past, have been 
repaired, and may fail again in the future (Edensor, 2016). In a more general sense, 
technologies to address urban resilience can lead to maladaptation in the long term and 
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potentially impede intergenerational justice where the economic needs of the present 
trade off against the future (Beck 1992, Barnett and O’Neill, 2010; O’Hare et al., 2016; 
White and Haughton, 2017). Thus, whether a technology is functionally efficient in itself 
cannot solely explain whether it becomes ‘successful’ or ‘fails’ over an extended period 
of time. 
 
Lastly, particular policy framings will influence claims of success and inevitably privilege 
the adoption of particular ‘solutions’ or ‘fixes’ (Füngfeld and MacEvoy, 2014). They may 
even over-state the benefits of technologies, given that proving their efficacy relies on a 
series of selective trial and error experiments (Taylor Buck and While, 2015). There is a 
hidden politics to the selection, design, and application of technology, which may serve 
to support preferred ideological, professional or institutional outcomes. As such: ‘it is thus 
important to reveal how science and technology can serve to internalize and reproduce 
certain values without seeming to’ (Castree et al., 2014). This is political since harnessing 
the promise of technologies requires: ‘an engaged political project that asks evaluative 
questions about how urban technologies are socially appropriated, why and in whose 
favour?’ (Coutard and Guy, 2007: 730).  
 
This section has emphasised how technologies may be understood as relational 
components nested within intricate socio-technological (and socio-ecological) systems 
(Hughes, 1987; Bijker et al., 1987). It also highlights how technological success may be 
contingent and that this is shaped by governance and power arrangements. In particular 
the extent to which problems are framed, the acknowledgement of issues connected to 
scale or time, or the involvement of views and values of differing social actors. 
Consequently, it is crucial to analyse the relations at play; how the wider systems, 
technologies and users are co-dependent and co-evolve, how they behave when in use, 
or the competing claims and evaluative frameworks attached to how technologies 
succeed and fail. Drawing from this literature, our empirical analysis of PFR centres on 
three related lines of enquiry: success for whom, success when and success where.   
 
Materials and Methods 
Our research examines how PFR became an accepted method of flood risk management 
within the UK. The work is based on several research grants that have looked at the PFR 
market in the UK between 2009 and 2018, providing an in-depth view of the emergence, 
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negotiation, and acceptance of an urban resilience technology in practice. In addition to 
the interviews and workshops described in an earlier paper (reference removed for peer 
review), we reviewed around 60 policy documents from 2004 onwards relating to flood 
risk management and climate change adaptation that made reference to flood resilience 
at both local, regional and national levels.  
 
Selected documents that referenced PFR were examined in closer detail. We used frame 
analysis to understand how certain epistemic communities (Haas, 1992) coalesced 
around the policy discourse on PFR, sought to define success, and how this is shaped 
and reshaped through interaction over different scales and across different actors and 
outlets (Foucault, 1971; Goffman, 1974). Entman (1993: 52) noted that framing helps to 
understand four fundamental characteristics of an issue: they define problems; diagnose 
causes; make moral judgments; and suggest remedies. Frames therefore provide 
interpretive storylines to shape information and ways of thinking, in this case around PFR 
technologies, consciously or unconsciously. The discursive analysis of frames relating 
to PFR helped to uncover the way in which meaning is attached to policy issues by 
different actors (Dryzek, 2012; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Hajer, 2002; Hajer and Versteeg, 2005; 
White and Nandedkar, 2019). By making the framing processes explicit, we could query 
who has the power to frame policy and technological success, and the resultant 
implications of this framing. Each document was examined to judge the notion of 
resilience implicit in the promotion of technologies, the extent to which the thinking 
supported short- and/or long-term goals, and the extent to which the focus shifted from 
solely being concerned with market uptake. Additionally, the analysis was supported by 
the researchers close involvement with policymakers and practitioners through 
attendance at steering groups and industry-led workshops that attempted to mainstream 
PFR through standardisation and guidance for PFR technologies (Flyvbjerg, 2002). 
Throughout the data collection period it became increasingly clear that there was a 
tension between different actors in terms of whether and how PFR products could be 
considered successful or not; an issue to which we now turn. 
 
Contesting Technological Success 
For almost two decades, there has been an increasing acceptance that large-scale flood 
defences cannot be the sole response to flooding. The European Floods Directive 
(Council Directive, 2007/60/EC) recognised the complexity of flooding and shifted to a 
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systems-based approach by enshrining, for example, catchment-based management 
and non-structural measures, such as early warning systems, urban planning, and the 
provision of measures to enable citizens to make their own judgements through flood 
risk maps. The changing language of the UK’s Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (Defra), whose remit includes flood defence spending, helps frame and 
contextualise this change, shifting from narratives of flood defence to flood risk 
management (Johnson and Priest, 2008) and, more recently, towards flood resilience 
and the use of PFR. Table 1 summarises the key policy and strategy developments 
underpinning the emergence of PFR and provides insights into the framing discussion 
or urban resilience. 
 
Year Author Policy/Strategy Main urban resilience aim 
2007 UK Government The Pitt Review  Identified the need for PFR as part of a 
wider flood resilience strategy. 
2009 DCLG Planning Policy 
Statement 25 – 
Development and Flood 
Risk Practice Guide 
Where properties are built in flood risk 
areas, construction should be resilient 
to mitigate flood risk 
2014 Defra/DCLG Repair and Renew 
Grant 
To help people with flooded homes buy 
and install measures to reduce the risk 
of flooding  
2016 Defra/DCLG Flood Resilience Grant To help people with flooded homes to 
make their properties better prepared to 






Resilience Action Plan 
(The Bonfield Review)  
To bring business interests together to 
facilitate the uptake of PFR and 
enhance ‘recoverability’. 
2017 Adaptation Sub-
Committee of the 
Committee on 
Climate Change 
Progress report on 
adaptation to climate 
change 
Identified that the uptake of PFR needs 
to rapidly increase in order to address 
the increasing amount of properties at 
risk of flooding under climate change 
2019 CIRIA Code of practice and 
guidance for property 
level resilience 
To provide a standardised approach 
and guidance to support the uptake of 
PFR 
Table 1: Main policy/strategies that support the mainstreaming of PFR.  
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Table 1 demonstrates both the emergence and framing of property level technology as 
an urban resilience solution and how the dominant language of technology brings with it 
its own norms and logics, such as connected to business, uptake or standardisation that 
will inevitably influence discourses of success. The starting point was the high profile 
flooding event of 2007 that led to the recommendation of retrofitting property-level 
resistant and resilient measures as part of a portfolio of approaches at different scales 
(Pitt, 2008). This initial strategy subsequently received further support and alignment 
within other related documents. For example, government support to increase the uptake 
of PFR was bolstered following responses to the widespread flooding in England over 
2013/14 and 2014/15. As part of the recovery, the Government made one-off grants of 
up to £5000 available to encourage property owners to use the window of opportunity 
afforded by repairs to make their properties more resilient. 
 
We begin to see framing discourses typically associated with technology emerge with 
calls to address ‘barriers to uptake’. This is due, in part, to the make-up of the 
stakeholders involved, as industry and government combined to develop The Property 
Flood Resilience Action Plan (Bonfield, 2017). Here, we see urban resilience strongly re-
framed in line with market logics and industry preferences with the aim to ‘…make the 
installation of flood resilient measures part of ‘normal’ business practice for those 
involved in the repair of buildings post flooding’ (Bonfield, 2017: 4). The document goes 
further in defining success in terms of the number of properties in receipt of PFR and the 
amount of public funds spent upon it, a claim that was echoed in wider climate change 
documents. For instance, PFR was identified in the Adaptation Sub-Committee (ASC) of 
the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) as essential to meeting the needs of the 
increasing number of properties at risk of flooding due to climate change, but there was 
a concern that uptake was not fast enough to meet this demand based upon current 
trends (ASC 2019: 130).  
 
While the literature review emphasised that there are a number of different ways of 
framing the success or failure of PFR, we can see how this contextual perspective does 
not influence the policy arena. The example has synergies with the ‘process and 
outcome’ oriented framing that is prevalent with other technology innovations, where the 
focus is on a process that can swiftly get a product to market and the outcome is enabling 
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uptake, even though this may not meet the needs of stakeholders who have not been 
involved in discussions. In short, success is framed as a product that is deemed fit for 
purpose and fitted. Failure is connected to problems regarding the innovation journey or 
market uptake. The policy documents and strategies also cascade these simple and 
selective success frames to other urban actors and agencies. We now bring the 
implications of this situation to light by examining three central lines of inquiry regarding 
contingent resilience in practice: success for whom, when and where.   
 
Success for whom? 
The previous section revealed how the success of flood resilient technologies at the 
property level scale has been framed by elite policy actors around traditional notions of 
markets and uptake. The data helps reveal the effects of this framing, as for some local 
authority flood risk managers PFR is identified as a less expensive ‘stop-gap’ measure 
where communities are awaiting a hard flood defence scheme (White et al., 2016) or is 
seen as ‘the only game in town’ for many local authorities who are legally obliged to help 
constituents to become more resilient. Cuts to funding mean that local authorities tend 
to perceive PFR to be more affordable than large-scale flood defence programmes 
(Interview, Flood Risk Manager). To further underscore this, a central government 
representative noted that PFR schemes ‘were developed to shut people up’ who were 
complaining about fewer capital flood defence schemes (Interview, civil servant). 
Therefore, norms of cost-benefit analysis have underpinned PFR as a preferred technical 
‘solution’, particularly within the context of financial austerity and high uncertainty. 
Conveniently, PFR technologies also fit within a wider narrative that expands (or 
fragments) the responsibility for flood risk management to a greater range of parties, 
including property owners (Johnson and Priest, 2008). PFR can be ‘sold’ to property 
owners as part of a resilience rhetoric in line with the techno-managerial policy logic 
(White and O’Hare, 2014). For these actors, technological integration is typically 
discussed as an outcome to be achieved or a process to be delivered, with the success 
of a technology assessed in terms of the extent to which either is realised.   
 
Similarly, the entrepreneurial narratives of PFR manufacturers and industry provides 
insights into their definition of success. With regard to the development of products, many 
agreed with the tried-and-tested metaphor of what some called ‘back of the fag pack’ 
approaches that reflect both the emergent nature of the industry and success being 
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about fewer barriers to design and uptake (Interview, PFR manufacturer A). Here, they 
attempted to address the gap in the market for property-level flood products through ad 
hoc measures and prototypes which were, in some instances, assembled by a self-
funded sole business operator. The interviewees from the industry sector revealed a 
strong consensus that success is a process that supports small businesses to be 
innovative and flexible, with less ‘red tape’ that may affect their ability to develop and test 
prototypes and sell these to property owners. Examining PFR product development 
reveals that standards were introduced to provide assurance, but this was a ‘Publicly 
Available Specification’ (PAS) rather than a fully-fledged British Standard. PASs are best 
practice agreed by a group of interested stakeholders who self-regulate and codify 
performance levels (BSI, 2014). A full standard requires consensus amongst a wide 
range of stakeholders whereas a PAS may be developed through consultation, but does 
not necessarily require consensus. This situation indicates that industry has not settled 
on a set of best practices or, more simply, has only agreed that success is 
implementation rather than performance. However, although individual products are 
tested and successfully achieve a ‘Kitemark’, the ways that flood water enters a building 
is complex and the dynamic nature of floods meant that few products had been tested in 
a ‘real’ environment (JBA, 2014). Thus, there is no real knowledge of the extent to which 
they successfully prevent flood waters entering a building. In practice, it often takes more 
than one type of PFR technology to increase the resilience of a property; as one 
stakeholder pointed out: ‘ultimately you want a resilient property rather than a resilient 
product’ (Workshop 2, local authority officer 2).   
 
The perspective of property owners provides more nuance, particularly as selling more 
products may not be beneficial to many. Logically, PFR businesses advertise within and 
target an urban area when property owners may be most receptive—that is, immediately 
after a flood event. Concern was expressed over ‘cowboy’ companies, who capitalised 
on flood events by focussing on affected areas in the immediate aftermath: ‘we’ve seen 
the market almost take the route of the proverbial double-glazing salesman…and when 
someone on the end building is anxious, they will buy the product anyway even if it is not 
the most appropriate for them’ (Interview 2, PFR Manufacturer). This means that property 
owners may be in receipt of technologies that are a ‘success’ from a technical or market-
based logic, but which may not be appropriate for particular building types or vulnerable 
people. The result may be that the property is still prone to flooding and would be 
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perceived as a failure by citizens. It was clear that the logic of property owners was very 
different. They did not care about market uptake. Their sole consideration was seeking 
to protect their own lives, properties, and possessions. While success from their 
perspective was unambiguous, some property owners were willing to be sanguine about 
the products. Despite being flooded, the PFR technologies lessened the damage and 
led one property owner to describe her third flood experience, and the first one with PFR, 
as ‘the best flood I ever had’ (Gupta 2014). Other stakeholders made different claims of 
success. Insurers, for example, were cautious. They deemed success as a fully working 
sector for the delivery of PFR with due certification and standards: ‘how do we go from 
those one or two pieces of tech to something that works more widely? That’s about 
systems and protocols across the (PFR) sector, making sure they are ok and that we 
can rely on them for pricing risk’ (Interview, Insurer).   
 
It is clear that simplistic technical narratives of success and failure do not mesh well with 
the dispersed governance of floods in the UK nor the design limitations of PFR 
technologies. It was also apparent that the initial framing between government and 
industry shaped the logics of flood risk managers working in practice, but was not shared 
by all, particularly property owners. We can now better appreciate that success for whom 
will have implications for success for where and when. There is little doubt that 
technology can play a role in urban resilience, but currently the framing of success has 
less to do with increasing resilience and more to do with private sector profit and 
technological norms. Consequently, narratives of success are imposed, focused on 
fixes, and privilege an elite view of success that is highly contingent.  
 
Success where? 
Scalar complexity adds a further dimension to claims of success. Any definition of 
resilience success (and conversely ‘failure’) relies upon the context in which it is used. 
Theoretically and conceptually, we are increasingly encouraged to see resilience from a 
systems perspective, however, technologies such as PFR are spatially blind. This can 
be seen through the lens of ‘residual risks’. UK planning guidance (CLG, 2015: section 
14) legitimates the notion of residual risk with regard to development in flood risk areas 
where: ‘residual risks are those remaining after applying the sequential approach to the 
location of development and taking mitigating actions.’ By residual, there is an explicit 
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recognition that mitigation efforts will not eliminate risk, it is rather redistributed spatially 
and temporally.  
 
More pointedly, the entire concept of defending against flooding at a building or 
community scale was an anathema for some citizens. In workshops, several users who 
had the measures fitted to their homes viewed their installation as an admission of failure 
rather than success. They framed success as new or strengthened traditional flood 
defences or a modification of the drainage system. The problem was not that houses, or 
flood receptors in technical language, were flooding and therefore needed a fix, it was a 
general problem of a lack of investment as they believed flooding should be managed at 
the source or pathway, rather than the receptor. As one local councillor in an area 
suffering from pluvial flooding stated: ‘The technologies deal with the symptom. But that’s 
not the cause and we know what the cause is… [one brook] has a Victorian six inch drain 
– it can’t take it.’ (Workshop 1, local councillor). 
 
A further issue of contingent resilience is related to how technical fixes of this nature 
displace water, rather than manage flooding across a system. So, from a catchment 
perspective, success for one stakeholder may bring failure for another as water is pushed 
elsewhere. The nature of the built form was also a consideration. In many parts of 
England, for example, there are many terraced properties. If all but one of the properties 
in the terrace purchase PFR, they are all still exposed, which leaves the technologies 
largely redundant: ‘My parents had installed technologies in their home, but the 
neighbours had not’, said one informant, ‘so when the area flooded, my parent’s 
defences were overwhelmed and their house flooded anyway’ (Workshop 2, utilities 
company). Therefore, while the fitting of a product to a household may be considered to 
be a success, at a community level resilience is contingent on the behaviour of others. 
The reductionist nature of the technologies and properties in the UK stands in contrast 
to the system perspective advocated in theory. One flood risk management professional 
commented: ‘everyone will protect their own first (“their castle”). Even within 
communities, this might make the problems worse elsewhere’ (Workshop 2, local 
authority officer 4). Such insights show that, in certain cases, the use of new technologies 
should be accompanied by community-level support and implementation, perhaps 
through a government body, rather than being put onto the open market for purchase by 
individuals. Success relating to products and markets is accompanied by individualistic 
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narratives of the consumer, but this does not recognise how resilience for others is 
contingent on more solidaristic approaches.   
 
Success when?  
The timing of success claims is the last empirical theme. Some of the newer PFR 
products are designed to replicate ‘ordinary’ property components: flood doors that look 
like normal doors, or that can be automatically deployed (colloquially known as ‘fit-and-
forget’ measures) removing the need for the property owner to initiative or install in the 
immediate threat of a flood. Here, success is partly measured by their ability to be non-
invasive, particularly for property owners who fear that obvious products will publicly 
acknowledge flood risk and blight property values. However, several interviewees raised 
the issue of ‘fit-and-forget’ measures being interpreted too literally: if people fit protection 
to their properties, and ‘forget’, they may become complacent, they may not maintain the 
products or they might be reluctant to form community-level groups and help one another 
should, given the limitations of technologies, a major flood take place. From an urban 
resilience perspective, you can see how risk will re-emerge in the future despite being 
claimed as a success at one point in time.  
 
There was also a challenge to the view of success as being when a product is fitted, 
rather whether it works or not. Early adopters expressed concern over the design quality 
of some measures. One resident with PFR claimed that: ‘to me it’s a bit amateurish, I 
can tell with my moderate building knowledge that if it was tested, it would seep 
through…’ (Workshop 1, property owner 7). There were significant concerns regarding 
their suitability. For example in one family home, the products could only be operated by 
the tallest member of the household, and even then with difficulty: ‘I have flood boards, 
but the handles are on the other side. so I climb a ladder to get over them to get the door 
open to take them out!’ (Workshop 1, property owner 6). Heavy flood boards requiring 
manual deployment could be sold to an older person with limited mobility. The products 
may have been tested under laboratory conditions, but they are being marketed to 
citizens who are largely assumed to be of the same risk profile and share similar 
capabilities.  
 
The same concerns were seen to occur in the maintenance of products. Workshop 
participants testified that few products had been inspected since they were installed, 
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which revealed this to be a contentious issue. Further, maintenance instructions were 
inconsistently passed on to the new resident and often only verbally. Many property 
owners admitted that they rarely checked their products, which increases the risk of them 
being inadequately deployed in a flood situation. The lack of maintenance can be 
considered to be a temporal issue insofar as the lack of attention beyond the initial 
moment of success poses ethical issues that transfer ‘failure’ into the future for others.  
 
There is also the risk of complacency and misunderstanding regarding the level of 
protection that is afforded by defined design parameters: ‘You can’t think that because 
you have the technology, and are protected to a certain depth, that you can just sit in 
your house, not thinking about if the flood overtops your defences.’ (Workshop 2, 
Consultant 1) The way that technological and governmental elites frame successful 
urban resilience in terms of products can also limit opportunities for adaptive learning or 
embedding transformational change within a system, either by individual stakeholders or 
with regard to the urban form. For example, there was a strong perception amongst 
residents that the existence of PFR would undermine efforts to get investment in hard 
defences in future. This type of contingent resilience, can therefore foreclose discussions 
of resilience in other areas. 
 
Discussion  
Whilst scholars have repeatedly shown the complexity of resilience theory, in practice 
this is reduced to a technical exercise with evidence of paradoxes in application whereby 
attempts to decrease risk in one place may increase risk at other temporal and spatial 
scales (Chelleri et al., 2015). Our analysis of PFR technologies also demonstrates these 
paradoxes, but highlights that the power to frame urban resilience ‘success’ is crucial. 
Elite governmental and technical actors have defined success and, with PFR, the focus 
on a swift process and market uptake is at odds with the operation of the technologies 
in practice and the reluctance of actors, such as insurers, to trust them.  
 
Table 2 reveals the variable framing of success for different actors and the contingent 
‘resiliences’ that are visible behind the simplistic and partial success claims. While there 
may be overlaps between groups, and that no one group can be treated as a cohesive 
whole, understanding the different frames is important given the high profile technology 
enjoys in urban resilience discourse and the power of those typically charged with 
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framing and implementing success. Central and local government, often constrained by 
fiscal spending, are promoting ‘defences’ at property scale to offset reduced flood 
defence spending at larger scales. As their priority is market uptake it has privileged one 
set of actors–the manufacturers–who are equally intent on reducing barriers to market. 
Insurers, on the other hand, prefer for floods to be managed away from properties, but 
focus on the near-term timescale and look for a reduction in insurance payouts to 
property owners as a measure of success. Engineers and flood risk managers tend to 
accept the need for holistic flood risk management and use forecasting techniques. 
However, this group of actors may ignore how, once a property is fitted with kit, a property 
appears resilient even though this may change further down the line. The property 
owners often displayed much more nuanced, long-term perspectives on the extent to 
which PFR succeeds possibly as a result of repeated flooding episodes. That said, 
property owners cannot be treated as a cohesive group and the frame will not hold for 
all. However, the potential is there to promote community-based initiatives rather than 
privileging a market-based, individualistic narrative that may detract from resilience at 
different scales and different times.   
 
Overwhelmingly, dominant narratives of successful resilience technologies, and by 
extension achieving resilient cities, focus on market uptake based on technological 
norms rather than a more nuanced risk management or resilience norms. The upshot is 
that appreciation of complexity, uncertainty and systemic perspectives associated with 
resilience theory are disconnected from practice. Moreover, technological success 
becomes fixed to a small place at a single point in time, which runs counter to our 
analysis concerning the contingency of technological success depending on who one 
asks, where they are located, and whether they take a short-term or long-term view.  
 
Stakeholder Aims Contingent resilience 
Central and local 
government 
Increased uptake and 
removal of barriers 
- Who? Success as market uptake 
- Where? Property level scale provides 
market opportunities and diverts 
attention from changing priorities in flood 
defence spending 
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- Who? Success as a resilient property 
with properly installed and maintained 
equipment 
- Where? Multi-scale: PFR as defences 
behind the defences 
- When? Mixed. Tend to focus on 
implementation but do look at 
forecasting. 
Manufacturers Flexible innovation 
environment and 
Increased uptake 
- Who? Success as market uptake 
- Where? Managing floods at property 
level provides market opportunities 
- When? Short-term thinking based on 
market uptake 
Insurers Reduction in 
exposure, ability to 
price performance 
- Who? Success as a reduction in pay-outs 
- Where? Manage floods away from 
properties 
- When? Short-term thinking based on 
immediate reduction in risk. 





- Who? Success as a resilient property 
with minimised damage costs 
- Where? Manage floods away from 
properties 
- When? Long-term thinking to promote 
their property.  
 Table 2: Contested framings of success amongst different stakeholders 
 
Science and technology are political. As Jasanoff (2012: 275) points out, how we choose 
to live with innovation is also political ‘entail[ing] normative judgments about the kinds of 
people we want to be and the kind of societies we wish to live in’. This is of concern for 
flood risk management since there is an increasing political belief that citizens should 
take more responsibility for their safety and that the creation of new markets can fill 
managerial gaps (Johnson and Priest, 2008). Such perspectives run counter to long-held 
beliefs and practices whereby citizens may not be willing or have the capacity to manage 
those risks, particularly those relating to so-called ‘natural’ disasters (Kaika, 2017). From 
our analysis, we can see that technological framings of success as market uptake from 
government and manufacturers run counter to the much more contingent resilience of 
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reality. Success varies; yet the policy discourse is myopic regarding the introduction of 
further risks or the redistribution of existing ones. The fact that failure and success can 
co-exist together and that the entry of flood waters into a property may mean failure for 
some, but could be a partial success for others if it is lower than last time.  
 
Not only are floods, and their management, dynamic but the implementation of 
technologies into practice is also beset with social and technical connections in order for 
them to work properly (Barry, 2001: 15). Mimicking similar discussions in relation to 
building certification standards, where a technologically innovative sustainable building 
of 1999 may no longer be considered sustainable today, PFR are a set of technologies 
that are difficult to compartmentalise and, consequently there is a need to open up the 
‘black-box’. If ‘resilience’ is recast as a fluid process, rather than an outcome (Pelling, 
2010), then it also becomes clear that the success or otherwise of innovations will 
similarly be fluid and contested over time. Successful PFR technologies may not equate 
to successful flood risk management. Achieving simple market penetration may help 
some, particularly the entrepreneurs, and fits with policies around green growth and 
smart urbanism, but in practice this may be at the expense of neighbouring buildings or 
provide a false assurance of safety. After all, the main reason whether a property gets 
wet or not, is the flood characteristics which cannot be controlled.  
 
The temporal issue also reappears in terms of maintenance and operation. The difficulty 
of communication is often due to the enormous range and forms of tacit knowledge 
necessary: including property surveying, flood knowledge, and procedures for 
installation and building work (Rydin, 2012; May et al. 2015). Yet the need to maintain 
becomes a means by which societies learn. Routine work that ensures that technologies 
are kept in mind and, in the case of most types of PFR, such routine work and 
maintenance is crucial in ensuring their relatively successful operation beyond 
installation. Innovation—in terms of getting the products to market—is often over-valued 
when it is the more mundane factors of maintenance that actually matter more in terms 
of longer-term technological success (Graham and Thrift, 2007).     
 
PFR may become widely accepted, surveyors may be trained to appraise buildings and 
standards may be implemented in order to make the market more efficient. Nevertheless, 
this article lends weight to the argument that we have become so focused on innovation 
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journeys that we often overlook what success and failure actually mean, how they are 
appraised, by whom, and the effect that failure may have on the present and the future. 
This is particularly crucial when considering urban resilience from a governance 
perspective. There are multiple beneficiaries and the dominant technical perspectives 
preclude resilience from being more long-term, multi-scalar and cross-networked (e.g. 
Ernston et al 2010; Carter et al 2015; Beilin and Wilkinson 2015). Furthermore, the quest 
for replicability and scalability of technological approaches to address climate change 
will need to pay more attention to the contingency of resilience and ensure that any 
potential ‘solutions’ are context appropriate. 
 
Conclusion 
This article accepts that adaptive technological solutions aiming to increase urban 
resilience can be a success, but emphasises that this success is contingent. The power 
to frame success has been shaped by long-standing norms of the technical and policy 
professions in a way that is much more simplistic than reality. The technological turn in 
urban resilience has a persuasive air of optimism, and a synergy with economic 
objectives, that obscures both how resilience is contingent, and how these technologies 
redistribute resilience spatially and temporally. Technologies are social and they are 
contested, but here they are presented as a ‘black box’ that is difficult for non-technical 
actors to open up. Stakeholders, particularly end-users, find it hard to counterclaim 
technical discourses of success once they have been negotiated and framed. Instead, 
these stakeholders are subject to a future where resilience is much more contingent, and 
is something for which they may not be prepared.  
 
By focussing solely on the route to market for climate resilient technologies, there is a 
danger that they become another ‘techno-fix’ that maintains the gap between resilience 
theory and practice and is blind to redistributive effects. Moreover, in the context of a 
dynamic climate and the changing parameters of what are deemed ‘acceptable’ risk 
thresholds for climate change, technologies may become less resilient over time. This 
underscores the need to raise awareness of resilience issues at community level, and to 
encourage wider learning, through the process of user interaction with adaptive 
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Trade-offs between resilience approaches are already widely mentioned in the literature 
but there are few critiques of climate resilient technologies in practice. The framework 
designed to analyse technological success, around  whom, when, and where, is a means 
to bring to light the governance aspects, power relations, and inevitable contingencies 
that are a part of urban resilience. There will always be the question of which actors and 
agencies are being privileged by resilience strategies, but we can also see that questions 
of when this occurs, how long it lasts, and how contingent this is, are also vital. The idea 
of bringing contingency to the foreground can be applied to other resilience examples. 
For instance, urban green infrastructure, such as street trees and sustainable drainage 
systems, can similarly be promoted as part of city marketing strategies for ‘green cities’ 
but may result in future house prices rising beyond the range of existing residents, or be 
perceived to encourage crime (Angelouvski et al. 2019). Beyond climate resilience, the 
policy evaluation literature has moved towards more granular understandings of policies 
and historical events to emphasise the ‘shades of grey’ between success, on one hand, 
and purported ‘failure’, on the other (McConnell, 2010; Newman and Head, 2015). As an 
extension of the discussion of PFR, we therefore hope that the study may influence other 
researchers to engage with notions of contingent resilience when seeking to understand 
the role, contribution, and constraints of innovative technologies.  
 
The words success and failure are a staple of innovation framings. For resilience 
technologies, however, it is important to recognise ‘success’ and ‘failure’ is highly 
contingent. Adaptive technologies like these should be conceived of as political 
processes, not technical processes, and success as contextual, contested, and perhaps 
temporary. The discourse of technological fixes displays an ontological certainty and 
simplistic causality that is disjointed from either how researchers write about resilience 
or the practices of deploying resilience technology in complex urban systems. . Perhaps, 
as the visionary architect Cedric Price suggested, the very notion of success needs to 
be dispensed with in a changing and uncertain world.  
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